EMPIRICAL OBSERVATION AND SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY: FROM POPPER TO LAKATOS

Abstract

This article analyzes the role of empirical observation in the construction and validation of scientific knowledge, emphasizing the contribution of Karl Popper's philosophy of science. It begins by reconstructing the epistemological debate from the Aristotelian tradition to modern empiricism, highlighting the transformations in the understanding of the relationship between experience, reason, and scientific inquiry. The study then examines David Hume's problem of induction and the attempts made by logical positivism to establish scientific validity through the criterion of verifiability. Within this context, Popper's critique of verificationism and his proposal to replace the logic of confirmation with the principle of falsifiability are analyzed. It is argued that Popper's main contribution lies in the formulation of a model of scientific rationality grounded in fallibilism, systematic criticism, and the permanent possibility of refuting theories. The article also discusses the influence of these ideas on economic methodology, highlighting both the contributions of falsificationism to empirical rigor and the difficulties involved in applying it to social phenomena. Finally, it examines Imre Lakatos's expansion of Popperian rationality through the methodology of scientific research programmes, which incorporates the historical dimension of theory development without abandoning the requirement of critical evaluation. It concludes that scientific objectivity depends less on the attainment of definitive truths than on methodological procedures that promote the continuous revision of knowledge.